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Financial Market Efficiency 
and the Effectiveness 
of Monetary Policy
mprovements in information processing technology and
 deregulation, among other forces, are profoundly 
transforming the financial sector of the United States and other 
advanced economies. Many of these changes are likely to 
improve the efficiency of financial intermediation, in the sense 
that the dispersion of valuations of claims to future payments 
across different individuals and institutions is minimized. For 
familiar reasons, this should be generally beneficial for the 
allocation of resources in the economy.
Some fear, however, that the job of central banks will be 
complicated by improvements in the efficiency of financial 
markets, or even that the ability of central banks to influence 
the markets may be eliminated altogether. This suggests a 
possible conflict between the aim of increasing microeconomic 
efficiency—the efficiency with which resources are correctly 
allocated among competing uses at a point in time—and that 
of preserving macroeconomic stability, through prudent central 
bank regulation of the overall volume of nominal expenditure.
Here I shall briefly address two possible grounds for such 
concern. The first is the possible elimination of a special role 
for commercial banks in the provision of credit. This might be 
expected to weaken the Fed’s leverage over aggregate 
expenditure through its ability to control the supply of bank 
reserves (and, to a lesser extent, through its regulatory 
oversight of member banks). The second is the dramatic 
reduction in recent years in the volume of Fed balances that 
banks must hold to satisfy reserve requirements. This has led to 
concern that reserve requirements may soon cease to bind, and 
that as a result the Fed would lose its main source of control 
over the pace of spending in the economy.
I believe that there is little ground for concern on either 
count. The effectiveness of monetary policy does not depend 
on the ability of central banks to manipulate significant market 
distortions, and the development of methods that allow central 
banks to achieve their stabilization objectives with as little 
interference as possible through the exercise of free choice over 
how funds are obtained to finance business activity should be 
beneficial to economic performance. Nor does effective central 
bank control over the pace of nominal expenditure depend on 
the creation of an artificial demand for central bank balances 
through the imposition of legal reserve requirements. This has 
already been illustrated by the experience of a number of other 
countries, such as Canada. It is true that the countries that have 
eliminated reserve requirements implement monetary policy 
in a somewhat different manner than is currently used in the 
United States. However, the United States could easily adopt 
the methods used in countries like Canada, and I suspect that 
there would be advantages to doing so.
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1. Financial Efficiency versus 
Macroeconomic Stability: 
Is There a Conflict?
A first question is whether the growing role of nonbank 
intermediaries and money markets as sources of business 
finance—reducing the special role once played by commercial 
banks, the institutions subject to the most direct control by the 
Fed—is likely to imply a reduced ability of the Fed to control 
the pace of spending in the economy and hence ultimately to 
achieve its inflation-stabilization objectives. I am inclined to be 
skeptical about the importance of such a threat. The 
presumption that monetary policy’s effectiveness depends on 
some special role of banks is based on an old-fashioned idea 
that monetary policy acts by rationing the flow of credit that 
would otherwise occur; the Fed acts by controlling the flow of 
oxygen to the economy, and must maintain a sort of 
choke-hold to do it. If one takes that view, one might well be 
worried that the increasing efficiency of the financial system, 
giving private parties opportunities to substitute away from the 
particular channels that the Fed is best able to obstruct, should 
reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy.
But the exploitation of distortions in the efficient allocation 
of credit by the market system is neither essential nor, in my 
view, a particularly desirable aspect of monetary control under 
present circumstances, whatever its importance may have been 
at certain times in the past. The main way that monetary policy 
now works—in the United States and throughout the 
industrialized world—is by affecting the level of interest rates, 
rather than through quantitative controls over credit flows. 
And not only does this seem to be a sufficient channel for 
central banks to achieve their stabilization goals fairly well—for 
central banks worldwide have done better at stabilizing both 
inflation and real variables over the past decade, despite having 
largely forsworn efforts to intervene directly in markets—but it 
is the one that is most consistent with an important argument 
for the use of monetary policy as our main tool of stabilization 
policy. This is the idea that monetary policy has an advantage 
of acting relatively uniformly on spending decisions 
throughout the economy, allowing policymakers to stabilize 
inflationary pressures without creating undue allocative 
distortions across sectors of the economy.
Some might argue that it should not be possible to control 
interest rates without controlling the supply of credit, so that 
the difference in the two approaches is more superficial than 
fundamental; and that while it might be preferable to restrict 
the supply of credit uniformly rather than solely through 
particular channels, some choke-hold will be needed, and 
regulations will likely be necessary to ensure that the part of the 
credit supply that the Fed can restrict will continue to matter 
for aggregate credit flow. But this represents an error in 
economic analysis, though not one that I can explain in detail 
on this occasion.
The important point is that there is not a particular level of 
interest rates that would be determined by the forces of supply 
and demand if the Fed were not able to interfere with them, for 
example, by preventing private institutions from offering credit 
on the terms with which they would otherwise be content. A 
typical partial equilibrium analysis of “the market for credit” 
might make it seem that there should be. But an intertemporal, 
general equilibrium analysis reveals that there is not. Spe-
cifically, general equilibrium analysis—in a model where, for 
the sake of simplicity, we suppose that all wages and prices are 
perfectly flexible—reveals that while relative prices have 
well-defined equilibrium values in the absence of distortions 
due to taxation or other government intervention, market 
forces cannot similarly determine the absolute prices of goods 
and services in terms of a fiat unit of account. The meaning of 
a “dollar”—the unit of account by which the prices of real 
goods and services happen to be quoted—would have to be 
determined by the policies of the Fed, even in a world where 
markets were completely efficient and completely 
unconstrained by government interference, for a dollar refers 
to nothing other than a type of Fed liability. And the central 
bank’s role in defining the meaning of a fiat unit of account 
need not involve any interference with the freedom of contract, 
any more than the establishment of a standard meaning of a 
unit of measure such as the “yard” represents interference with 
the freedom of contract in markets where goods such as cloth 
may be sold by the yard.1
It should furthermore be noted that not only is the meaning 
of a “dollar” something that can be determined by an arbitrary 
decision of the Fed, without any defiance of market forces 
being required, but there is a separate arbitrary decision of this 
kind to be made at each point in time. Just as market forces do 
not determine the value of a dollar on any given day, they do 
not require that its value (in terms of real goods and services) 
be the same from day to day. (Nor do the principles of 
geometry require that a yard be the same length from day to 
day, though life is simpler given the decision to define it so!) 
This means that the nominal interest rate that should be 
available between any two dates is not determined by market 
“fundamentals,” but is instead up to the arbitrary decision of 
the central bank, insofar as the nominal yield in question is 
defined in units of the liabilities of that central bank. This is 
important because in practice central banks find it more 
convenient to pursue their policy aims through control of 
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through purely financial transactions) rather than by directly 
seeking to fix the exchange value of their liabilities in terms of 
any real goods and services.
At this point, one might object to my only providing an 
argument for the indeterminacy of the nominal interest rate in 
a world without government interference in markets; there 
would still be a well-defined, market-determined real rate of 
return over any time period, whereas central banks actually 
need to control real rates if they are to affect real expenditure. 
It may furthermore be argued that the apparent ability of a 
central bank to control nominal interest rates as it wishes 
depends upon the assumption that prices in terms of dollars 
can be freely adjusted without any consequence for relative 
prices, while there are important nominal rigidities in practice. 
It might then seem that even central bank control of nominal 
interest rates should be ineffective in practice, unless it is 
possible to obstruct credit flows.
But a more careful analysis would reveal that the existence 
of nominal rigidities undermines the argument that real 
interest rates should be determined by economic 
“fundamentals” in the absence of distortions resulting from 
government policy. Economic fundamentals (preferences, 
technology, and property rights) should determine an 
equilibrium real rate of interest consistent with market 
clearing—the real rate of interest required to induce people to 
demand at each point in time exactly the amount that the 
economy is able to produce. But if wages and/or prices do not 
immediately adjust in order to clear goods markets and labor 
markets, then the real interest rate need not be at this level, even 
in the absence of any interference with the behavior of private 
parties; a different real interest rate is simply associated with a 
different intertemporal pattern of imbalances between supply 
and demand.2 The possibility of central bank control over 
nominal interest rates—indeed, the necessity for the central 
bank to signal to the private sector how nominal variables 
should evolve, if there is to be any determinate level of nominal 
interest rates—remains; but in such a world (which is our own 
world), central bank control over nominal interest rates also 
implies an ability to shift real interest rates, at least 
temporarily.3
Adjusting the real rate of interest does not require the 
obstruction of credit flows, because it does not require that 
there be any difference of opinion between different parts of 
the economy as to what the marginal rate of substitution would 
be between additional real income at two different dates. 
(Actual interference with the process of financial 
intermediation instead creates heterogeneity of this kind: some 
people assign a higher relative value to income now than to 
income tomorrow, but are nonetheless unable to borrow from 
those that assign it a lower relative value, and so have a motive 
to lend.) A reduction in the interest rate by the central bank can 
lead everyone to perceive expenditure now to be cheaper than 
usual, in terms of foregone expenditure tomorrow; this 
remains consistent with equilibrium because a larger quantity 
of goods is made available for use today in response to the surge 
in demand, owing to the rigidity of wages and/or prices.
Once this is understood, it becomes clear that 
improvements in the efficiency of the financial system—such 
as the entry of new participants into credit markets, or into the 
federal funds market, or into wholesale securities markets—
need pose no threat to the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Instead, one should expect developments of this kind to 
increase the efficiency of the link between the particular 
interest rate that the Fed directly targets, the federal funds rate, 
and the general structure of interest rates and asset prices 
(including the shadow cost of funds to various households and 
firms, which may not show up as any market interest rate at all 
when financial markets are inefficient). This is exactly what one 
should hope for, in order to make monetary policy a more 
reliable instrument for accurately controlling spending 
decisions in the economy, and one that can do so in a way that 
distorts allocative decisions to the minimum possible extent.4 
Thus, there is no reason to seek to slow down improvements in 
financial efficiency on the grounds that this should allow better 
control by the Fed over macroeconomic conditions.
2. The Disappearance of Required 
Reserves and Central Bank 
Control of Interest Rates
Some may accept that central bank influence upon 
macroeconomic conditions through the control of short-term 
interest rates does not depend on any special role for 
commercial banks in financial intermediation, and yet 
nonetheless be concerned about another recent development: 
the sharp reduction in recent years in the quantity of Fed 
balances that banks need to hold in order to satisfy their reserve 
requirements.5 Indeed, it is already the case that many 
individual banks need hold no balances at the Fed for this 
purpose: their reserve requirements are already more than 
satisfied by their holdings of vault cash. This has led to 
expressions of concern that reserve requirements may soon 
cease to bind in the United States. The fear is that this may 
eliminate the Fed’s ability to control the volume of spending in 
the U.S. economy, or at least impair the accuracy with which it 
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That this trend may continue is quite possible; banks have, 
after all, a clear motive to reduce their required reserves, as long 
as they do not pay interest, as they do under current U.S. 
arrangements. And given the motive, it is hardly surprising that 
institutional innovations (such as the spread of sweep 
accounts) should appear that serve this end. But once again, I 
think that there is little ground to fear that such developments 
should seriously impair the Fed’s ability to pursue 
macroeconomic stabilization policy.
One reason to fear the possibility that nonbinding reserve 
requirements would mean a loss of Fed control is again the 
choke-hold view of monetary policy. According to this view, 
the Fed has to be able to obstruct credit flows somewhere; 
reserve requirements (together with quantitative control of the 
supply of reserves) imply a quantitative limit on the flow of 
funds through commercial banks, but if the requirements do 
not bind, the Fed’s control of the supply of reserves does not do 
anything to limit bank credit. I have already taken issue with 
this general view. All that matters is that the Fed be able to 
control overnight interest rates; this gives it the leverage that it 
needs in order to pursue its stabilization objectives.
A more subtle question is whether elimination of a need to 
hold balances at the Fed to satisfy reserve requirements could 
interfere with the Fed’s control of the funds rate. The funds rate 
is determined in an interbank market for overnight Fed 
balances; the Fed’s ability to control the market-clearing rate 
through its control of the supply of Fed balances depends on 
the existence of a nontrivial demand for such balances that is at 
least somewhat interest-elastic. Traditional textbook accounts 
of the demand for Fed balances stress the demand for such 
balances to satisfy reserve requirements; if such demand 
disappears, can the Fed still exert any influence over overnight 
interest rates?
The answer is surely yes. A number of countries, including 
the United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand, have completely eliminated reserve requirements. Yet 
these countries’ central banks continue to implement 
monetary policy through operating targets for an overnight 
interest rate, and continue to have considerable success at 
achieving their operating targets. Indeed, some of these central 
banks achieve much tighter control of overnight interest rates 
than does the Federal Reserve.6
The elimination of required reserves in these countries has 
not meant the disappearance of a market for overnight central 
bank balances. Instead, central bank balances are still used to 
clear interbank payments. Indeed, even in the United States, 
balances held to satisfy reserve requirements account for less 
than half of total Fed balances at present,7 and Furfine (2000) 
argues that variations in the demand for clearing balances 
account for the most notable high-frequency patterns in the 
level and volatility of the funds rate in the United States. In the 
countries without reserve requirements, this demand for 
clearing purposes has simply become the sole source of 
demand for central bank balances. Given the existence of a 
demand for clearing balances, a central bank can still control 
the overnight rate through its control of the net supply of 
central bank balances.
Nonetheless, the disappearance of a demand for required 
reserves may have consequences for the way that a central bank 
can most effectively control overnight interest rates. In an 
economy with an efficient interbank market, the aggregate 
demand for clearing balances will be quite small relative to the 
total volume of payments in the economy. Exactly for this 
reason, random variation in daily payment flows can easily lead 
to fluctuations in the net supply of and demand for overnight 
balances that are large relative to the average level of such 
balances.8
A consequence of this volatility is that quantity targeting—
say, adoption of a target for aggregate overnight clearing 
balances while allowing overnight interest rates to attain 
whatever level should clear the market, as under the 
nonborrowed reserves targeting procedure followed in the 
United States in the 1979-82 period—will not be a reliable 
approach to stabilization of the aggregate volume of spending, 
if practicable at all. And even in the case of an operating target 
for the overnight interest rate, the target is not likely to be most 
reliably attained through daily open market operations to 
adjust the aggregate supply of central bank balances, the 
method currently used by the Fed. The overnight rate at which 
the interbank market clears is likely to be highly volatile, if the 
central bank conducts an open market operation only once, 
early in the day, and there are no standing facilities of the kind 
that limit variation of the overnight rate under the “channel” 
systems used by many of the countries without reserve 
requirements.
In the United States at present, errors in judging the size of 
the open market operation required on a given day can be 
corrected only the next day without this resulting in daily 
fluctuations in the funds rate that are too great, owing to the 
intertemporal substitution in the demand for Fed balances 
stressed by Taylor (2001). But the scope for intertemporal 
substitution results largely from the fact that U.S. reserve 
requirements apply only to average reserves over a two-week 
period; and indeed, funds rate volatility is observed to be higher 
on the last day of a reserve maintenance period (Spindt and 
Hoffmeister 1988; Hamilton 1996; Furfine 2000). There is no 
similar reason for intertemporal substitution in the demand for 
clearing balances, as penalties for overnight overdrafts are 
imposed on a daily basis.9 Hence, the volatility of the overnight 
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higher under such an operating procedure, in the complete 
absence of (or irrelevance of) reserve requirements.10
But many central banks in countries that no longer have 
reserve requirements nonetheless achieve tight control of 
overnight interest rates through the use of a “channel” system. 
In a system of this kind, the overnight interest rate is kept near 
the central bank’s target rate through the provision of standing 
facilities by the central bank, with interest rates determined by 
the target rate. It is largely the interest rates associated with the 
standing facilities that determine the interest rate at which the 
interbank market clears each day.11
Under such a system, in addition to supplying a certain 
aggregate quantity of clearing balances (which can be adjusted 
through open market operations), the central bank offers a 
lending facility, through which it stands ready to supply an 
arbitrary amount of additional overnight balances at a fixed 
interest rate. In Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, this 
lending rate is generally set exactly 25 basis points higher than 
the target rate. Thus, there is intended to be a small penalty 
associated with the use of this lending facility rather than the 
acquisition of funds through the interbank market. But funds 
are freely available at this facility (upon presentation of suitable 
collateral), without the sort of rationing or implicit penalties 
associated with discount-window borrowing in the United 
States.
Depository institutions that settle payments through the 
central bank also have the right to maintain excess clearing 
balances overnight with the central bank at a deposit rate. 
The deposit rate is positive but slightly lower than the target 
overnight rate, again so as to penalize banks slightly for not 
using the interbank market. Typically, the target rate is the 
exact center of the band whose upper and lower bounds are set 
by the lending rate and the deposit rate; thus, in the countries 
just mentioned, the deposit rate is generally set exactly 25 basis 
points below the target rate. The lending rate, on the one hand, 
and the deposit rate, on the other, then define a channel within 
which overnight interest rates should be contained. Because 
these are both standing facilities, no bank has any reason to pay 
another bank a higher rate for overnight cash than the rate at 
which it could borrow from the central bank; similarly, no 
bank has any reason to lend overnight cash at a rate lower than 
the rate at which it can deposit with the central bank. 
Furthermore, the spread between the lending rate and the 
deposit rate gives banks an incentive to trade with one another 
(with banks that find themselves with excess clearing balances 
lending them to those that find themselves short) rather than 
depositing excess funds with the central bank when long and 
borrowing from the lending facility when short. The result is 
that the central bank can control overnight interest rates within 
a fairly tight range regardless of what the aggregate supply of 
clearing balances may be; frequent quantity adjustments 
accordingly become less important.
Woodford (2001) gives further details of a simple model of 
overnight rate determination under such a system. The key idea 
is that the demand for clearing balances should depend on the 
location of the interest rate at which such balances can be 
traded in the interbank market relative to the bounds of the 
channel, rather than in absolute terms. (This determines the 
opportunity cost of leaving funds overnight in one’s clearing 
account that might otherwise have been loaned in the 
interbank market, and the cost of having to cover an overdraft 
in one’s clearing account that could have been avoided by 
borrowing in the interbank market.) Hence, the central bank 
can shift the rate at which the interbank market is likely to clear 
by shifting the interest rates associated with the two standing 
facilities without any immediate need for an adjustment of the 
supply of clearing balances. Under the system described, such 
adjustments occur automatically whenever the central bank 
changes its target overnight rate.
Even if reserve requirements were to become completely 
negligible in the United States, owing to further improvements 
in the ability of banks to serve the needs of their customers 
without holding appreciable overnight balances in reservable 
accounts, effective control of the funds rate should still be 
possible through the adoption of a channel system for 
implementing the Fed’s operating targets for the funds rate.12 
Such a system should be highly effective, and would not require 
any change in the way that the Fed formulates its operating 
target for the funds rate. The effectiveness of funds rate control 
as a means for influencing the overall level of spending and 
hence inflationary pressures would be unaffected.
3. Advantages of Payment of Interest 
on Fed Balances
Implementation of a channel system in the United States 
would, of course, require certain institutional changes. One of 
the more obvious of these is that interest would have to be paid 
on Fed balances, contrary to current practice. But this is a 
development that would have much to recommend it, quite 
apart from the way in which it would be possible to enhance 
control of the funds rate through linkage of the interest rate 
paid on reserves to the funds rate operating target.
First of all, payment of interest on Fed balances should 
improve the efficiency of the financial system by eliminating 
the penalty that currently exists for the use of means of 
payment (for example, checks drawn on reservable accounts) 
that result in increases in the balances that commercial banks 90 Financial Market Efficiency 
must hold at the Fed. The argument is one that was probably 
most famously articulated by Friedman (1960), who called for 
the payment of interest on required reserves at a rate similar to 
the market rate on short-term Treasury securities.
Friedman’s basic argument is fairly simple. Requiring banks 
to hold non-interest-earning reserves at the Fed in proportion 
to the volume of reservable accounts at those banks is 
equivalent, in terms of the economic consequences, to taxing 
the banks for allowing their customers to maintain such 
deposits. Like other taxes, this one has economic consequences 
that go beyond the mere transfer of revenue from private 
parties to the government. Taxing transactions deposits 
penalizes banks for allowing customers to maintain accounts of 
that kind. As a result, banks will take actions that discourage 
their customers from maintaining as much money in such 
accounts as they would in the absence of the tax—for example, 
by paying less interest on account balances of this kind. This 
penalty will in turn discourage the banks’ customers from 
holding such large balances in these accounts, and this will 
require them to carry out transactions in ways that allow them 
to maintain lower average balances in reservable accounts. The 
result is wasted effort as the banks’ customers complicate their 
lives for the sake of tighter management of their reservable 
account balances.
Even supposing that one grants the desirability of reserve 
requirements—though I have argued above that they are not 
essential for monetary control—this unfortunate consequence 
of the legal requirement can be eliminated by payment of 
interest on reserve balances at a rate that is similar to what the 
banks could reasonably have expected otherwise to earn on 
those funds. This implies an efficiency gain from paying 
interest on such balances.
One might ask whether the mere fact that a requirement to 
hold non-interest-bearing reserves is like a tax implies that it 
would be in the public interest to repeal it. After all, taxes are 
necessary in order to finance essential government activities. 
Does the contribution to government revenues perhaps not 
outweigh the economic importance of the distortion of the way 
that transactions are arranged that I have just mentioned?
In fact, in the literature on “optimal taxation,” a substantial 
consensus has emerged, according to which it is not desirable 
to tax transactions balances at all, despite the assumed necessity 
of financing the activities of the government and despite the 
fact that all available sources of government revenue create 
distortions of one sort or another.13 While the theoretical 
analysis of this question is fairly subtle, and the exact 
conclusions reached depend on many details of the assumed 
structure of the economy, the basic insight involved is again 
relatively straightforward.
When one penalizes people or firms for holding 
transactions balances, one is also penalizing them for making 
the purchases that are facilitated by those balances. The result 
is a distortion both of people’s decisions to make those 
purchases, which have effectively been made more expensive, 
and of their decisions about how to organize their transactions 
so as to reduce the holdings of reservable balances required to 
carry out any given volume of purchases. The second of these 
distortions could be eliminated by directly taxing the 
purchases, say, through an increase in sales taxes. This 
alternative form of taxation could raise for the government the 
same level of revenue with a lower overall distortion of the 
pattern of economic activity. Hence, the conclusion obtained 
by most students of the question is that an optimal taxation 
system would not involve any taxation of transactions balances. 
This would require payment of interest on reserves, at a rate 
similar to the market rate of interest available to banks that lend 
funds overnight to private parties.
The arguments just reviewed for the payment of interest on 
Fed balances held to satisfy reserve requirements would apply 
equally to Fed balances held for clearing purposes.14 Taxing 
clearing balances similarly penalizes banks for using Fed 
balances for that purpose, and hence ultimately penalizes the 
customers of banks for using means of payment (checks cleared 
in this way) that require the banks to hold such balances. 
Payment of interest at a rate that reduces the opportunity cost 
to banks of holding clearing balances to a level close to the 
social cost of providing them would again eliminate a 
deadweight loss;15 and again, this particular source of revenue 
is likely to be an inefficient tax, on account of the general 
argument just sketched against the desirability of taxing a 
particular means of payment.
At the same time, the payment of interest on Fed balances—
at least if implemented in the right way—should facilitate Fed 
control of overnight interest rates, rather than impair it. One 
reason has been discussed above: the possibility of using 
adjustments in the interest rate paid on Fed balances to help 
steer the funds rate to its target level, as under a channel system. 
But it should also be noted that the threat to the effectiveness of 
present Fed methods of implementation of the funds rate 
operating target discussed in the previous section would also 
likely be greatly reduced if interest were paid on reserve 
balances. If the opportunity cost of holding balances at the Fed 
were substantially reduced, the incentive to substitute away 
from reservable balances (for example, through the use of 
sweep accounts) would be correspondingly reduced. The likely 
result would be a larger demand for Fed balances to satisfy 
reserve requirements. This in turn would facilitate control of 
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increasing the intertemporal substitutability of the demand for 
Fed balances, as discussed above.16
It is important to note, however, that much depends on the 
details of the scheme according to which one plans to pay 
interest on reserves. There are some ways of doing this that 
could hamper Fed adjustment of overnight rates in response to 
changing economic conditions.
One problematic proposal would be the payment of a 
constant interest rate—say, a legislatively mandated interest 
rate of 5 percent per annum—on Fed balances that would 
apply to excess reserves as well as required reserves. The 
problem with this proposal is that banks would then never have 
any reason to lend funds overnight to one another at any rate 
lower than 5 percent; it would always be possible to obtain that 
much by leaving the funds with the Fed and there would be no 
credit risk to worry about, either.
The consequence would be that the Fed would never be able 
to push the fed funds rate below 5 percent, no matter how 
many reserves it chose to pump into the system through open 
market operations. This would limit the Fed’s ability to lower 
overnight rates when necessary. The events of 2001 illustrate 
the fact that at times, the Fed needs to be able to lower the 
federal funds rate sharply relative to normal levels; if legislated 
interest payments on reserves had established a floor of 
5 percent for the funds rate, we would surely have regretted 
this in the fall of 2001.
An equally problematic proposal would be the payment of a 
variable interest rate on all reserves—excess as well as required 
reserves—that is tied to the federal funds rate itself. I have 
summarized above the familiar argument that the distortions 
resulting from effective taxation of transactions balances would 
be eliminated as long as the interest on reserves is always equal 
to the rate that banks could earn on these funds if not required 
to hold them at the Fed; this might suggest that a commitment 
to pay interest on reserves at a rate equal to that day’s fed funds 
rate would be desirable. But such a commitment would destroy 
the federal funds market. For no bank would ever lend funds 
overnight to another bank at any rate of interest if it knew that 
it can obtain the same rate by simply depositing the funds 
overnight with the Fed.
Moreover, promising to pay a rate equal to the current 
federal funds rate minus a fixed spread would also be 
problematic. For in that case, any shortage of reserves relative 
to banks’ demand—due, for example, to a misestimate of the 
size of open market operations required to stabilize the funds 
rate on a given day—that results in an increase in the federal 
funds rate would automatically raise the interest rate paid on 
balances held with the Fed as well. But this increase in the 
interest rate on Fed balances would further reduce the supply 
of funds in the interbank market, as banks would find it less 
attractive to lend to one another given the availability of a 
higher earning alternative use of their funds. Thus, increases in 
the rate paid on Fed balances would drive up the market- 
clearing rate in the fed funds market, causing further increases 
in the rate paid on Fed balances and so on in a self-reinforcing 
spiral. The result is that large swings in the funds rate (in either 
direction) could result from small initial imbalances between 
the supply of and demand for reserves. Such a system would 
complicate the Fed’s control over the funds rate through its 
daily open market operations and likely lead to much greater 
funds rate volatility than we observe under present 
arrangements.
However, both of the problems just mentioned could be 
avoided if the Fed were to pay an interest rate on Fed balances 
that was tied to its current operating target for the federal funds 
rate, as under a channel system. This would avoid the problem 
of a fixed rate that constrains the ability of the Fed to lower 
interest rates when necessary. For when the Fed lowered its 
funds rate target, the rate paid on Fed balances would be 
correspondingly reduced so as to allow the funds market to 
clear at the lower rate.
It would also avoid the instability resulting from the 
self-reinforcing mechanism just described. For if the Fed were 
to underestimate the supply of reserves needed to satisfy 
demand at the target funds rate on a given day, the resulting 
rise in the funds rate would not increase the rate paid on Fed 
balances; the latter rate would continue to be tied to the funds 
rate target, rather than to the actual funds rate.
Thus, it is possible to pay interest on Fed balances in such a 
way as not only to avoid these problems, but actually to 
enhance the Fed’s ability to control overnight interest rates. 
Such a system would increase the efficiency of cash 
management and payments in the U.S. economy as well. 
Finally, both the feasibility and effectiveness of such a system 
have already been demonstrated in other countries, such as 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The United States would 
do well to consider following their example.Endnotes
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1.  The difference between relative and absolute prices in this regard, 
and its consequences for a proper conception of the role of monetary 
policy, was first stressed by Wicksell (1936). See Hall (1999) and 
Woodford (2002a) for more recent discussions.
2. In the familiar Hicksian terminology, there is an “IS schedule,” 
rather than a single equilibrium real rate of interest, and monetary 
policy can determine which point on that schedule the economy 
reaches.
3. In such a model, it is useful to distinguish, as Wicksell (1936) does, 
between the “natural rate of interest”—the equilibrium real rate of 
return that would occur, given current fundamentals, under 
conditions of full wage and price flexibility—and the actual (real) rate 
of interest, determined by monetary policy. This distinction is 
developed analytically in the context of an explicit intertemporal 
general equilibrium model of the monetary transmission mechanism 
in Woodford (2002b), which also discusses the usefulness of the 
concept as a guide for monetary policy.
4. Woodford (2001) makes a similar point about the desirability of 
increased private sector information about central bank policy. Even 
if the inability to catch markets by surprise means a smaller effect on 
market rates of a given size of trade by the central bank, a change in 
rates that occurs should be more effective in achieving the central 
bank’s goals, owing to the tighter linkage between current conditions 
in this market and the rest of the economy—the source of the smaller 
effect on market rates.
5. This has been documented in this volume by Bennett and Peristiani 
(2002).
6. See the figures presented in Woodford (2001). For example, in 
Canada, the standard deviation of daily deviations of the effective 
overnight rate from the Bank of Canada’s target rate has been reduced 
to about 1 basis point, while in the United States it continues to be 
larger than 10 basis points.
7. See, for example, Woodford (2001, Table 1). Roughly the same 
quantity of Fed balances represents “required clearing balances.” 
These are amounts that banks agree to hold on average in their 
accounts at the Fed, in addition to their required reserves; the banks 
are compensated for these balances in credit that can be used to pay for 
various services for which the Fed charges fees. However, the balances 
classified this way do not fully measure the demand for clearing 
balances. Banks’ additional balances, classified as “excess reserves,” are 
also held largely to facilitate clearing; these represent balances that the 
banks choose to hold ex post, above the “required balances” negotiated 
with the Fed in advance of the reserve maintenance period. Further-
more, the balances held to satisfy reserve requirements also facilitate 
clearing, insofar as they must be maintained only on average over a 
two-week period and not at the end of each day. Thus, in the absence 
of reserve requirements, the demand for Fed balances might well be 
nearly as large as it is at present.
8. See, for example, Woodford (2001, Figure 3), showing the daily 
variation in aggregate overnight balances at the Reserve Bank of 
Australia over several periods during which the target overnight rate 
does not change and over which the actual overnight rate was also 
relatively stable.
9. This is emphasized by Furfine, for whom it is crucial in explaining 
how patterns in daily interbank payments flows can create 
corresponding patterns in daily variations in the funds rate. However, 
the system of compensating banks for committing to hold a certain 
average level of “required clearing balances” over a two-week 
maintenance period introduces similar intertemporal substitution 
into the demand for Fed balances, even in the absence of reserve 
requirements.
10. The increase in funds rate volatility in 1991 following the 
reduction in reserve requirements is often interpreted in this way; see, 
for example, Clouse and Elmendorf (1997). However, declines in 
required reserve balances since then have to some extent been offset by 
increased holdings of required clearing balances, and this is probably 
the reason why funds rate volatility has not been notably higher in 
recent years.
11. See Woodford (2001) for a detailed discussion of such systems and 
details of their recent implementation in Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand.
12. Meyer (2001) also proposes this as a possible solution to the 
problem.
13. For a recent survey of relevant literature, see Chari and Kehoe 
(1999).Endnotes (Continued)
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14. They would also apply to the payment of interest on Federal 
Reserve notes (that is, currency), if it were practical to do so. The only 
reason why proposals to pay interest on reserves have been more 
widely discussed is that it is quite easy to see how the Fed can arrange 
to pay interest on balances held with it, should it wish to do so, 
whereas it is less easy to think of practical ways to pay interest to the 
holders of Federal Reserve notes. But the payment of interest on vault 
cash, at least, would seem completely practical.
15. Efficiency would best be served by having the Fed charge for its 
clearing services but not for maintaining higher average balances in 
clearing accounts.
16. This is the most important reason for the desirability of paying 
interest on reserves, in the view of Meyer (2001).References
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